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Faith and Philosophy

also suggestions for alternate concrete categories. Without a self-conscious,
historically understood, practice of moving between abstractions and concrete
phenomena, it is impossible to avoid the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Guilt
is too concrete, I believe, to be generalizable as an essential characteristic of
religion.
To accept the protection of abstraction against bias and dogmatism may well
be to abandon phenomenology of religion as a discipline with its own integrity.
Westphal makes no exclusive claims for it, and his practice here is very helpful
for its purpose. I would hope, however, that he would now tum his considerable
talents and erudition to a more inclusive philosophy of religion.

Philosophy of Religion: Thinking about Faith, by C. Stephen Evans. Downers
Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 1985. Pp. 191. $6.95.

STANLEY OBITTS, Westmont College.
This book is one of the "Contours of Christian Philosophy" series of which Prof.
Evans is also the editor. The series describes itself as consisting of "short,
introductory-level textbooks," a description which accurately fits this book. Yet
the book is far from superficial, is up-to-date, is very readable, and is remarkeably
thorough for its size.
The thrust of the book is a Christian justification of religious belief. Right
from the beginning the stance of the book on the relation of faith and reason is
made clear. Fideism is rejected because it denies the common ground with the
nonbeliever required for genuine reflection on religion. The presuppositionless
approach of neutralism is found equally unsatisfactory for it ignores what weak
foundationalism recognizes, namely, that reason is "a willingness to test one's
commitments." The approach said to be taken in the book is that of a "critical
dialog" with the nonbeliever, always open to his objections.
Little more than an "impasse" is promised in the dialog, however. For example,
in Malcolm's version of the ontological argument the weak premise is said to
be the one holding that God's existence is possible (not impossible), because
the nonbeliever supposedly would not accept it. And since the criterion of rational
conviction is "person relative," the dialog breaks down. But is the theistic God's
existence impossible? If not, then it must be possible, which is all Malcolm's
argument needs. If the nonbeliever refuses to admit this, then at least he should
be made to feel the onus of breaking off the dialog for no good reason. Perhaps
the sllccess of an argument should not be so tightly linked with its being convincing
to a given individual. One could be so intent on maintaining the posture of
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"critical dialog" with the nonbeliever that the significance for truth of the soundness of an argument is underplayed.
The diffidence displayed in natural theology vanishes when an appeal is made
to religious experience and special revelation. Non-mystical, psychologically
immediate, experiences of God mediated through his creation, his acts in history,
a hymn, etc., are held to provide prima-facie evidence, which, having been
checked against overriders, can be considered ultima-facie evidence. A similar
confidence comes through the receipt of special revelation, with its "'authenticating miracles. '" Where such appeals leave the dialog with the nonbeliever is
not clear.
The book concludes with a balanced, sensitive treatment of the role one's
personal faith plays in the "critical dialog" with the nonbeliever and his objections.
The believer is advised to make a cumulative case a la Basil Mitchell, based on
"less-than-algorithmic evidence" admitting of logical, and a modicum of existential, doubt.
Given the limitations in length and readers' background, the treatment of the
religious language problem could have been shortened in favor of the chapter
on objections to theism. Not only would this have made a somewhat compressed
chapter more understandable to the neophyte, but it would impress the nonbeliever
with the seriousness with which the dialog with him is being taken. Nonetheless,
the book is an authoritative, concise survey of the subject which should be
unusually effective in making the Christian faith more "rationally convincing."

Reason Within the Bounds of Religion, by Nicholas Wolterstorff. 2nd edition.
Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1984. Pp. 161.
GARY GUTTING, University of Notre Dame.
The first edition (1976) of Nicholas Wolterstorff's Reason Within the Bounds of
Religion dealt with the intellectual integrity of Christian scholarship. Its main
thesis was that Christian doctrine may and should act as a constraint on the sorts
of positions a Christian scholar holds in his area of expertise. This thesis conflicts
with the standard modem view of inquiry as the unrestricted pursuit of truth
wherever evidence and argument lead. Wolterstorff maintained that the ideal of
unrestrained inquiry is defensible only on the basis of epistemological foundationalism; only, that is, if there is available a body of certainties (the foundation
of knowledge) from which all valid knowledge claims can be derived. He attacked
foundationalism, arguing first that foundationalists have given no adequate explication of how knowledge claims are derived from the foundations and, second,

